Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) result in 86% of European deaths and 77% of the European disease burden. 3 The distribution of NCDs is not equal: the lower somebody's socio-economic position, the worse his(her) health will be and the lower their expectancy. Following increasingly powerful calls, the European Union (EU) has given the prevention of NCDs and the reduction of health inequalities greater thought.
This paper assesses, from a behavioural research perspective, interventions introduced by EU consumer law to prevent NCDs. After discussing the ubiquity of European health inequalities, it reviews the determinants of these inequalities and demonstrates that these are in fact inequities which demand regulatory action. The paper then broadly examines the range of interventions the EU legislature has introduced -primarily information regulation -in order to reduce NCDs and why these have failed to both prevent NCDs and reduce health inequalities.
The paper then analyses the controversial debate on the extent to which behavioural research should play as a core consideration in consumer policy. The paper concludes that regulating consumer information is a useful tool for NCD prevention, but that it requires integrating of greater insights from the way consumers actually behave if it is to reduce health inequalities. Moreover, there are limitations to policies which regulate information, and therefore the EU should make more use of other tools in its regulatory toolbox.
I. Introduction
The global burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) is staggering. NCDs account for 36 million deaths, or 63% of global mortality. 4 The regional impact of NCDs is equally overwhelming: NCDs result in 86% of European deaths and 77% of the European disease burden.
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The Political Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Non-communicable Diseases, 6 adopted in 2011 by the UN General Assembly, confirms that the threat and burden of NCDs represent one of the major challenges for development in the twenty-first century. In reaffirming the right of everyone to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, it recognises the urgent need for greater prevention and control. The Declaration calls on Member States to deliver multisector, multi-level, population-wide, evidence-based, health-in-all-policy action, which is not only affordable but also cost-effective. Particularly, the Declaration calls on Member States to create health-promoting environments which empower people to make healthy choices and lead healthy lives. It confirms that the most prominent NCDs -namely cancers, cardiovascular diseases, chronic respiratory diseases, and obesity -are linked inextricably with the conditions in which people live and their lifestyles and behaviours. 7 These diseases are largely preventable, particularly through a reduction in exposure to the modifiable risk factors of unhealthy diets, excessive consumption of alcohol, tobacco use, and a lack of physical activity.
The distribution of these NCDs is far from equal amongst different groups of the population: there is a strong socioeconomic gradient between the health status of the lower and higher socioeconomic groups. The lower somebody's socioeconomic position ('SEP') is, the worse his or her health is likely to be. People from lower SEP groups live shorter lives than people from higher SEP groups; and live more of their shorter lives with disease. These inequalities in health are linked inextricably with, again, the conditions in which people live and their behaviours. These social determinants of health, and the health inequalities they result in, are in fact inequities which demand action as a matter of social justice.
Following increasingly powerful calls to tackle the determinants of NCDs, 8 the European Union (EU) has given the prevention of NCDs and the reduction of health inequalities greater thought. 9 Its actions on tackling the major modifiable risk factors of unhealthy diets, tobacco use and excessive alcohol consumption have ranged from soft, non-binding measures in the case of alcohol, to stronger measures in the case of tobacco, with nutrition falling somewhere in-between.
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Where the EU has taken legislative action, with the exception of product safety, this has centred primarily on trying to influence consumers towards healthier behaviours through regulating the information environment in which consumer live, work and play. These policies are not only insufficiently effective, but they have also failed to reduce the inequalities in health which remain pervasive throughout the European populations.
This paper assesses, from a behavioural research perspective, 11 interventions introduced by EU consumer law to prevent NCDs. After discussing the ubiquity of European health inequalities, it reviews the determinants of these inequalities and demonstrates that these are in fact inequities which demand regulatory action. The paper then broadly examines the range of interventions the EU legislature has introduced in order to reduce NCDs and why these have failed to both prevent NCDs and reduce health inequalities. This focusses on the EU's heavy reliance on regulating the consumer information environment. It demonstrates that the measures the EU has introduced in its consumer policy are not meaningful enough to prevent NCDs and reduce health inequalities -in fact, they are more likely to increase health inequalities because they are more ineffective for members of lower SEP groups. 8 See for instance 'Global strategy for the prevention and control of noncommunicable diseases' World Health Assembly Resolution 53.14 adopted With this in mind, the paper then analyses the controversial debate on the extent to which behavioural research should play as a core consideration in consumer policy. The paper concludes that consumer information is a useful tool for NCD prevention, but that it requires integrating of greater insights from the way consumers actually behave if it is to reduce health inequalities. Moreover, there are limitations to policies which regulate information, and therefore the EU should make more use of other tools in its regulatory toolbox.
II. Inequalities and the social determinants of health
While the concept of health inequalities is not a new one, these inequalities were 'discovered' in the 19th century mainly as a result of the availability of new epidemiological data. Since then, the great need to eradicate health inequalities has featured at the highest global levels. Already in 1978, the Alma-Ata Declaration acknowledged that:
The existing gross inequality in the health status of the people particularly between developed and developing countries as well as within countries is politically, socially and economically unacceptable and is, therefore, of common concern to all countries.
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Though these issues have received increasing attention with the turn of the century, 13 it remains the case that inequalities in health continue to be pervasive. Even in countries which have taken a historic lead in investigating health inequalities, such as the UK, little has been achieved to successfully eradicate such inequalities.
14 After defining health inequalities, this section discusses the ubiquity of European health inequalities, and reviews the determinants of these. It then demonstrates that these inequalities are in fact inequities which demand regulatory action. 
A. Health inequalities and health inequities
The phrase 'health inequality' is the 'generic term used to designate differences, variations, and disparities in the health achievements of individuals and groups'.
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A simple example of a health inequality is that the life expectancy at birth of a female born in the highest scoring Member State of the EU is almost eight years higher than in the lowest scoring Member State. Similarly, the life expectancy at birth of a male born in the highest scoring Member State of the EU is almost 12 years higher than in the lowest scoring Member State.
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When health inequalities are 'systematic, socially produced (and therefore modifiable) and unfair', 17 they are also said to be health inequities.
In the examples above, the health inequalities between the populations from the highest scoring and lowest scoring Member States, in the case of both females and males, are also inequities. There are also inequalities between males and females, but these are not necessarily inequities as women tend to live longer than men for non-social, non-modifiable reasons.
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Differentiating inequalities from inequities is important for a number of reasons. Systematic and non-systematic inequalities are distinguished in order to exclude random differences, by only including those differences which show a consistent distribution across the population. By only considering those inequalities which are socially produced, biological causes which are fixed and unavoidable can be excluded, not least because these are not amenable to modification. 19 Through only considering those differences which are unfair, that is to say those 'health inequalities that are preventable by reasonable means', 20 an approach can be taken which reflects real-world limitations.
While inequalities may be a factual statement, and inequities a normative statement which demands regulatory action as a matter of social justice, this distinction is not always used. The literature uses the terms interchangeably. Following this trend, the remainder of this paper uses the phrase 'health inequalities' as synonymous with the more accurate 'health inequities'. The poor health of the poor, the social gradient in health within countries, and the marked health inequities between countries are caused by the unequal distribution of power, income, goods, and services, globally and nationally, the consequent unfairness in the immediate, visible circumstances of peoples [sic] lives -their access to health care, schools, and education, their conditions of work and leisure, their homes, communities, towns, or cities -and their chances of leading a flourishing life…Together, the structural determinants and conditions of daily life constitute the social determinants of health and are responsible for a major part of health inequities between and within countries.
B. Health inequalities in the EU
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In order to understand why SEP is correlated with health status, it is first necessary to begin with the diseases which affect those in lower SEP groups more than those in higher SEP groups.
26 Socioeconomic position, in this paper, is used to refer to social status in its widest sense, including factors which may not traditionally be considered to relate to socioeconomic status, such as gender, sexuality and ethnicity. There are many other definitions of SEP. Indeed, the use of socioeconomic position is in itself not universal. The most common similar phrase is socioeconomic status, but others also exist, including social class. This paper takes these as synonymous. It is well known that the biggest killers and the biggest sources of disease burden in Europe, and indeed globally, are NCDs. These are not only more prevalent in people from lower SEP groups, but they also cause more deaths in lower SEP groups. This pattern is seen for all four major groups of NCDs: cancers, 31 cardiovascular diseases, 32 chronic respiratory diseases 33 and obesity. 34 This higher mortality and morbidity in lower SEP groups can be said to be the cause of health inequalities.
The causes of these causes are also well documented. Through disaggregated data, it is known that members of lower SEP groups live more with the major unhealthy risk factors: unhealthy diets, 35 tobacco use 36 and excessive consumption of alcohol.
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Members of lower SEP groups live more with the risk factors which cause NCDs, and in turn more with NCDs. However, this evidence demonstrates correlation, but not causation. 38 As Josiane Bonnefoy et al identify:
'With respect to the social determinants of health, we are able to identify some of the necessary and the sufficient conditions involved in causation but their nature, under what circumstances, and how they operate from the social to the biological is not always very clear. The core candidates can be listed relatively easily because the extant literature has explored them at length'. material/structural, psychosocial and behavioural/cultural models, with the health selection and artefact theories having been largely discredited. These approaches have been explored elsewhere.
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As EU consumer law places the burden of making healthy decisions on the consumer, through the concept of 'consumer empowerment', 41 the behavioural/cultural model is particularly relevant. This approach hypothesises that SEP emphasises differences in behaviours that are either beneficial or detrimental to health. It is thought that certain groups of the population have 'cultures' 42 which are associated with unhealthy risk factors, and this is the cause of health inequalities. The idea of behaviours associated with cultures cannot be denied. However, this approach presents an incomplete picture -it does not explain why the behaviour of members of lower SEP groups follows this social patterning. 43 Therefore, even this approach is of limited use in explaining the underlying determinants
In the absence of a non-contentious, complete theory on social patterning of behavioural risk factors, policy-makers can focus on the causal pathway of health inequalities. Hilary Graham identifies that inequalities in the social/material structure of society lead to inequalities in the consumer's socioeconomic position. This leads to inequalities in the consumer's environment, which causes inequalities in the consumer's behaviour and psychology. These behaviours lead to disease differentials. 44 Following this pathway, it becomes clear that interventions designed to change consumer behaviour in order to reduce health inequalities are best directed at improving the consumer's environment, the social/material structure of society, or both.
III. Policy failures
The European Commission acknowledges that health inequalities between advantaged and disadvantaged citizens are inconsistent with the EU's aspirations of equality of opportunity, protection of human rights, social and economic cohesion, 40 multi-sector, health-in-all policies approach with the backing of political will. 53 They should also include legal interventions.
A. Legal interventions to reduce NCDs and health inequalities
Law provides significant and diverse opportunities for preventing NCDs. Of its many advantages, some of the more notable ones include its universal application to all actors, its binding nature and ability to be enforced with consequences, its democratic process, its susceptibility to legitimate challenge before the courts, and its ability to change societal norms. 54 It is therefore not surprising that the WHO Global Action Plan refers specifically to law as a tool for the prevention and control of NCDs.
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In developing law and legal instruments, EU policy-makers have a number of tools at their disposal. These include disclosure requirements, information regulation schemes, marketing suppression, measures affecting product availability, economic instruments, fundamental rights approaches, performance-based regulation, selfregulation, supportive policies such as education campaigns, and civil liability schemes.
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This is not to say that law is a panacea in NCD prevention. Law does have limits, not least that the regulatory process can be slow and resource-intensive. Indeed, in addition to being a source of opportunities, law is also a source of constraints, such as with the constitutional limits in which the EU operates. Moreover, 'the legality, design, legitimacy as well as the effectiveness of several regulatory interventions intended to promote healthier behaviours remain highly contested'. 57 It is only through understanding these constraints, will policy-makers be able to maximise opportunities. The question is not so much whether the law can play an important role in promoting healthier behaviours -it clearly does. Rather, the question is how the law can be designed to support effective NCD prevention and control policies and withstand legal challenges.
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B. The limitations of EU consumer policy
Notwithstanding that multiple tools in the regulatory mix need to be employed to tackle the NCD epidemic, the overwhelming majority of legislative measures have been introduced under the EU's consumer protection competence. 60, 61 These have been aimed at reducing NCDs generally, and have targeted specific or intermediary determinants. If Hilary Graham's causal pathway above is recalled, this revolves around changing the environment so that it is conducive to healthier behaviours. Such measures have focussed on the information environment through, for instance, food labelling requirements, tobacco warnings and prohibitions against misleading marketing.
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Regulating information as a tool of consumer protection expanded significantly following the 1960s, with the adoption of a 'Preliminary Programme of the European Economic Community for a Consumer Protection and Information Policy' and its explicit acknowledgment that consumers have the right to information. 63 This has remained at the core of the EU's consumer protection agenda. 64 The EU's legal response to NCD prevention, and the protection of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, has also focussed heavily on the consumer information paradigm. 65 This envisages that consumers are provided with sufficient and accurate information so that they become well-informed, and therefore make rational decisions which protect their health. 66 Information disclosures as a tool for NCD prevention enjoys many advantages, which can be categorised into economic and equitable, 67 as well as pragmatic, rationales.
Briefly said, economic efficiency can result from information disclosures because they correct informational asymmetries which favour industry. 68 Thus, the typical policy responses focus on providing information to consumers; and, where such information is unlikely to be processed and acted upon, to regulate the substance of transactions. 69 The equity rationale asserts that consumers have the right to information; 70 and consumers' desire to be informed about products 71 should be fulfilled. However, in addition to there being no consensus on what it means to be sufficiently informed, 72 fundamental rights arguments have not yet been systematically utilised by the public health community. 73 The political pragmatism rationale also favours information, as disclosures are often easier to implement than 'command and conquer' rules. Also, by not reducing choice, consumer autonomy can be preserved, which in turn ameliorates allegations of paternalism and its pejorative conceptualisation through the 'nanny state'. 74 If it is accepted that the regulation of information leads to consumers being empowered, and thereby guides them to healthier choices, information schemes would be consistent with NCD prevention. However, the current information paradigm is not consonant with achieving these aspirations. This is because law, in importing the concept from neoclassical economics, takes as an axiom rational consumers who make consumption decisions which best match their true needs when armed with sufficient and accurate information. Rational consumers are said to maximise 'their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets'. 75 Characterised as homo economicus, this consumer is 'perfectly informed, forward-looking, invariant in his preferences, and whose decisions are unencumbered by irrelevant contextual influences'. This is the foundation on which consumer laws and policies have been adopted.
The thrust of this paper is that a substantial source of the failure to reduce NCDs and health inequalities arises from EU consumer law and policy not taking sufficient account of how consumers, especially those from lower SEP groups, actually behave.
As one of the main tasks of law, consciously or unconsciously, is to change behaviour, its ability to implement rules to effect such changes depends on the accuracy of the models of behaviour on which it is based. These models should not only foresee the response of consumers, but also include insights into why consumers are predicted to act in such ways.
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The difficulty, therefore, of the rational consumer model centres on its lack of predictive power and the implausibility of its predictions. Behavioural research -an umbrella term which encompasses fields including behavioural economics, psychology, sociology, management, consumer decision making, and many othershas helped identified three key reasons for this.
Firstly, the information paradigm promoted by the EU presupposes that consumers are given good quality, sufficient information which is accurate and not misleading.
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The EU therefore takes responsibility for ensuring that the consumer has available the necessary, valuable information. The difficulty with this is that information 75 provided is not always sufficient and of good quality, and not always accurate and not misleading. 78 There is therefore a disparity between the behaviour of the notional consumer and the real-world consumer.
Secondly, behavioural economics has brought to the fore the identification of the two sets of systems of thought, which can be considered endogenous limitations. 79 System 1 is the automatic system: it is uncontrolled, effortless, emotional, unconscious and fast, and has great capacity but engages superficially. System 2 is the reflective system: it is controlled, effortful, deductive, self-aware and slow, and has limited capacity but engages deeply. 80 This research reveals that consumers rarely act completely rationally -what is often termed 'bounded rationality' 81 -not least because consumers are subject to heuristics and biases. Despite this, the behaviour change model on which much of law 82 -including consumer law 83 -is grounded takes as its base a strong vision of System 2, and largely discounts the role of System 1.
Thirdly, rationality is not always determinant of consumer decisions, as consumer behaviour is multifaceted. 84 In particular, there are exogenous factors which can impact on consumers following through with healthy purchasing decisions. For instance, a consumer may make a perfectly rational decision to purchase and consume more fruit and vegetables, but may not have local access to a retailer who supplies these products, or may not have sufficient income to purchase healthier products which are often more expensive than less healthy products. These behavioural insights apply at all stages of the purchasing process. Therefore, in order for information to influence behavioural choices positively, consumer decision theories reveal that consumer must (i) be exposed to the information and (ii) perceive it. They must then (iii) understand the information and (iv) draw an inference of the healthiness of product. Then (v) integrate this with other information. This will influence the (vi) evaluation of the product, and eventually the (vii) purchase decision.
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The corollary of the application of behavioural insights to the purchasing process is to reveal that a failure to sufficiently incorporate the findings of behavioural research into consumer policy leads to the development of rules which may not be effective in NCD prevention. 88 This is not to say, however, that consumer law has not taken any account of behavioural research. This is far from true. 89 Instead, it is to say that, despite some limited behavioural insights, the rational consumer model in consumer law still lacks sufficient predictive power and maintains implausible predictions. EU consumer law does take behavioural considerations into account when developing new legislation. 90 However, when behavioural research is taken into account, two limitations remain. Either (i) the standard against which consumer behaviour is assessed is particularly high; or (ii) the expectation of consumer behaviour is improbable.
C. Behavioural insights in consumer law
For limitations of space, this section discusses two examples from recent consumer protection legislative acts which have, at least in part, the objective of NCD prevention. The first is the case of the Food Claims Regulation 91 which, through its average consumer benchmark, assesses consumer behaviour against an exceptionally high standard. The second is the revised Tobacco Products Directive 92 which, through its provisions on warnings, places an improbable expectation on consumer behaviour.
(a) Food Claims Regulation
Notwithstanding the EU's early awareness of the negative effects of unhealthy diets, and the importance of food labelling in informing and educating consumers, 93 it is only in recent years that the EU has taken a more active, joined-up approach to food labelling which fuses considerations of economic interests with that of health. 94 What has resulted is the current regulatory system governing food information which aims for 'the protection of the interests of consumers' through enabling 'consumers to make informed choices in relation to the foods they consume'. with general EU consumer law, 98 a benchmark is taken of the average consumer who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect taking into account social, cultural and linguistic factors.
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The notion of the average consumer has developed over a substantial body of case law. 101 This asserts that the average consumer is an active player in the market who reads information 102 but perhaps will pay less attention to common products. 103 The average consumer will have background knowledge. 104 The average consumer will also be critical towards information, and not take information literally. 105 The average consumer will not be misled easily if sufficient information is available. 106 The reality is that consumers do not always read food information, 107 will not always have background knowledge, 108 will not always be critical towards information, 109 and therefore will often be misled. 110 Moreover, although the Court does not prohibit research polls and expert opinions, which may provide statistical or qualitative insight into consumer behaviour, it stresses the issue being one for judicial assessment.
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The benchmark is 'an attempt to navigate a course between the rich diversity of actual consumer behaviour and the need for an operational regulatory benchmark.' 112 However, in aiming for a workable pan-European standard, 113 and adopting a measure of maximum harmonisation, there remains little room to take into account the differences which exist between consumers. 114 The Regulation seeks to mitigate these difficulties by only permitting 'nutrition claims' which appear on a closed list in the Annex to the Regulation. As regards 'health claims', the Regulation provides that these 'should only be authorised…after a scientific assessment of the highest possible standard.' 115 The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), who is tasked with delivering opinions on health claims, shall 'give advice on whether the proposed wording of the health claim is understandable and meaningful to the average consumer' 116 and take this understanding into account when assessing application for authorisation of claims. 117 In its initial assessment of claims, which must also follow the average consumer test laid down by the CJEU, EFSA rejected approximately 80% of claims submitted to it. This has certainly helped wipe out a great number of misleading statement. However, the known processes of EFSA, 118 as well as its implementing rules, 119 do not make explicit reference to consumer understanding. Indeed, the Panel on Dietetic Products, Nutrition and Allergies at EFSA, which deals with substantiation of food claims, does not have members who specialise in matters of consumer understanding. 120 It therefore remains the case that while the EU has made much progress, it has not gone far enough.
Indeed, the original proposed Food Claims Regulation included a provision which would have prohibited food claims if the food product did not meet a certain nutritional profile. As the preamble correctly notes: 'The application of nutrient profiles as a criterion would aim to avoid a situation where nutrition or health claims mask the overall nutritional status of a food product, which could mislead consumers when trying to make healthy choices in the context of a balanced diet.' 121 This, however, transpired to be 'one of the most debated articles' in the proposed Regulation. 122 The final text of the Regulation was diluted in two ways. Firstly, the restrictions are less restrictive than originally proposed. Secondly, nutrient profiling was not detailed in the text. Instead, the Commission was required to establish such a system. Reaching consensus on this has proved so difficult 123 that no profile has been adopted by the Commission. 124 The deadline expired in January 2009.
(b) Tobacco Products Directive
The revised Tobacco Products Directive (TPD2) takes into account behavioural research most notably by requiring larger graphical warnings; 126 and removing the tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide (TNC) declaration. The preamble specifically notes this behavioural basis:
'The labelling provisions should also be adapted to new scientific evidence. For example, the indication of the emission levels for tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide on unit packets of cigarettes has proven to be misleading as it leads consumers to believe that certain cigarettes are less harmful than others. Evidence also suggests that large combined health warnings comprised of a text warning and a corresponding colour photograph are more effective than warnings consisting only of text. As a consequence, combined health warnings should become mandatory throughout the Union and cover significant and visible parts of the surface of unit packets. Minimum dimensions should be set for all health warnings to ensure their visibility and effectiveness.'
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The advantages of warnings are well known. They educate consumers as to health risks, increase motivation to quit, undermine brand value, and can therefore help reduce smoking rates. Although there is 'broad consensus that these warnings are legitimate and helpful' 128 tobacco warnings required by the first Tobacco Products Directive 129 proved not be in line with best evidence. 130 'There is a genuine difference between information provision and information impact'. 131 Consumers often do not see or notice warnings, do not understand warnings, and may also ignore warnings even if they are visible and comprehensible. 132 Therefore, following the binding commitments the EU and its Member Stats have signed up to through the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 133 improvements followed with TPD2. These included increased size, more visible placement, combined warnings which include both text and graphics, and better rotation of warnings. 134 However, the behavioural limitations of warnings persist even for well-designed warnings. 136 It is therefore not surprising that the revised information scheme, on its own, will contribute to an unambitious estimated 1-1.5% reduction in smoking over the first five years of the Directive. 137 With the limited effectiveness of tobacco warnings, it is suggested that standardised, sometimes known as plain or generic, packaging would be a more useful tool. This would maintain warnings but otherwise enforce 'drab, purposefully unattractive packaging, devoid of branding (other than name) or promotional information. 138 Through reducing the appeal of the products, increasing the effectiveness of health warnings and reducing the ability of packaging to mislead consumers about the harmful effects of tobacco, such packaging would discourage adults and children from taking up smoking, encourage people to give up and discourage relapses. 139 The Commission's impact assessment, which was based on extensive evidence, made clear that standardised packaging would be the most effective policy: it would strengthen the internal market, improve equality, and have the most positive implications for consumer health. 140 Although the Commission acknowledged that standardised packaging was 'expected to achieve the policy objectives even more effectively' it did not recommend this 'given the current lack of real life experience, pending legal disputes regarding the plain packaging and serious concerns expressed by some stakeholders'. 141 In this context it is useful to note that the adoption of TPD2 was mired in controversy, delay and unprecedented industry lobby 142 with 'no previous public consultation launched by the European Commission
[having] ever registered such significant participation'. During the public consultation on the revision, the most controversial element proved to be the provision of consumer information.
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The reduced effectiveness of information regulation in NCD prevention, through the omission of sufficient insight from behavioural research, is exaggerated in members of lower SEP groups. In other words, interventions benefit lower SEP groups much less than higher SEP groups. Compounded with the fact that some interventions may have limited impact anyway, this becomes an appreciable hindrance to improving the health of members of lower SEP groups. Policies, in effect, perpetuate health inequalities.
This could be for a number of reasons, but there is a large dearth in the literature highlighting the behavioural research implications on health inequalities. As there has been no systematic attempt to explain why the omission of behavioural insights is more detrimental to lower SEP groups, this paper seeks to fill this gap. From the broader literature, three reasons can be inferred.
The first reason relates to the endogenous limitation of consumers. This is that consumers from lower SEP groups are subject to greater limitations of both Systems 1 and 2 -their rationality is 'more bounded'. For instance, poverty causes psychological consequences, including stress and negative affective states, which lead to short-sighted and risk-averse decision-making, which reinforce habitual behaviours more strongly.
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The second reason relates to the interaction between the consumer's endogenous limitations and their exogenous environment. This is that, because of the circumstances in which people from lower SEP groups live, the negative effects of bounded rationality are exaggerated. For instance, poorer members of society will more often have to make decisions which require volition. This draws on their finite psychological resources, so that earlier acts to maintain willpower for healthy decisions will have detrimental impacts on later attempts at volition. This decision fatigue is more common in lower SEP groups.
able to follow through with healthful decisions if their poverty means that purchasing is restricted by cost. 146 These ideas are compounded by the two inherent assumptions of the EU information paradigm -that information is both sufficient and accurate -as these are not designed with lower SEP groups in mind.
IV. Policy opportunities
In light of the difficulties discussed in this paper, behavioural insights have been steadily increasing in prominence in law, but have yet to achieve mainstream acceptance into policy-making. 147 As Jolls and Sunstein note:
To the extent that legal rules are designed on the basis of their anticipated effects on behavio[u]r, bounded rationality is obviously relevant to the formulation of legal policy. But an important and under-addressed question is precisely how it is relevant to the formulation of legal policy. The most obvious possibility is that, given a demonstration of the existence and importance of a particular aspect of bounded rationality, the law should be structured to presume the persistence of that particular feature of human behaviour. 148 However, while 'laws fail because of a failure of the behavioural models on which they are based', 149 findings from behavioural research do not necessarily provide a ready solution for more capable policy. Nevertheless, the implications of not taking a lead from behavioural insights are too great to ignore. 150 The remainder of this section, therefore, seeks to synthesise when behaviourallyinformed interventions are warranted, what types of interventions are desirable, and how these can be incorporated into consumer policy.
Behaviourally-informed policies are often dismissed for three reasons. Critics claim, firstly, that these policies are paternalistic and infringe consumers' personal autonomy, but the issue of paternalism has been explored at great length in the literature. Secondly, some question the effectiveness of behavioural findings, but interventions should only be based on sufficient and best available evidence, with a thorough analysis of the foreseen implications, unintended consequences and the balancing of all other options. Thirdly, others highlight the multifactorial nature of NCDs. 151 The multifactorial nature of NCDs is also openly accepted. However, behavioural insights are not peddled as a magic bullet. 'Instead, behavioural economics can perhaps best be thought of as offering a library of tools, not all of which can be used at any specific time, but each of which may be of use in some particular contexts. Behavioural economics is not a panacea, but by using the insights from human psychology that are embedded in the approach, academics and policy makers may be able to design interventions that -in some circumstancesare relatively well equipped to motivate people to behave in ways that are better for themselves, and for society at large.'
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Moreover, the aim of behavioural policies is not to change the law entirely, or to make out that behavioural interventions are without difficulties. 153 It is to find a balance between preventing NCDs and reducing health inequalities, while still promoting the functioning of the internal market taking a high level of consumer protection. 154 Consumer law should adopt laws which not only take into account the behaviour of consumers generally but which place greater emphasis on the behaviour of members of lower SEP groups in line with the principle of proportionate universalism.
When developing NCD prevention policies there are five pertinent questions. Firstly, do consumers suffer from systematic misperceptions about the product or the practice? Secondly, do sellers respond strategically to this misperception? Thirdly, does this consumer misperception increase the likelihood of developing NCDs or increasing health inequalities? Fourthly, is legal intervention warranted and, if so, what type of legal intervention is desirable? 155 The overriding consideration for each of these cases should be the degree to which members of lower SES groups are affected. 156 There has been much research in recent years on the actual 157 and potential 158 success of behavioural research in NCD prevention. The findings are often conflicting or context-specific. It is therefore not always easy to incorporate findings into policy. 159 Indeed, the evidence on behavioural approaches to a reduction in health inequalities, especially in differing SEP groups, is even less explored. Nevertheless, even based on current research, there is sufficient evidence that behavioural interventions work. 160 With future experimentation, and with commissioning of research on this, the EU would be in a position to determine the effectiveness of specific behavioural policies. Indeed, many policies are well research and already known to the Commission, including nutrient profiling, front of pack nutritional labelling and standardised tobacco packaging. Moreover, where research suggests that information regulation is failing to provide effective solutions, this must be accepted, and other interventions in the regulatory toolbox adopted.
V. Conclusion
'Non-communicable diseases can be prevented and their impacts significantly reduced, with millions of lives saved and untold suffering avoided.' 161 There is no easy way to achieve this most necessary of aims. It demands action and cooperation from all levels and sectors of society. However, the EU's current failures in consumer protection can be said to originate to a significant degree from a reliance on the information paradigm with its assumption of rational actors. The EU desperately needs to re-evaluate its laws in light of increasingly strong evidence which makes clear that consumers have limitations of the mind, interact with their environment, and face external obstacles.
Individual policies require specific research to ensure that they are based on the best available evidence with minimal chance of unintended consequences. With more attention given to behavioural research, and the calls for more research, the EU can develop a sound understanding of how specific policies can incorporate behavioural insights for NCD prevention and health inequalities reduction.
What is needed is an integrated approach which recognises the reduction of health inequalities as a prime consideration. To achieve this, firstly, behavioural insights, especially those from consumers in low SEP groups, need to be integrated into mainstream consumer policy at every stage of development. Secondly, where behavioural research reveals that the information paradigm is unlikely to lead consumers to make healthier behavioural decisions, other tools in the regulatory toolbox, such as marketing restrictions, need to be deployed.
